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Theory of Moral Sentiments 1759 vs. Theory of Moral Sentiments 1790:
A Change of Mind or a Change in Constraint?
Maria Pia Paganelli

The 1790 edition of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments presents significant changes from the 1759 edition. In the 1790 edition Smith seems critical of the moral consequences of commerce. By focusing exclusively on the
approbation generated by showing off material possession, I propose that the
1790 edition is just an updated edition of the1759, and does not represent a
change of mind Smith had. Writing The Wealth of Nations Smith realizes the
constraints in poor pre-commercial societies are different from the constraints
in rich commercial societies and therefore behaviors and consequences will
differ. The apparent contrast between the two editions of Theory of Moral
Sentiments can therefore be interpreted as only apparent.
(J.E.L.: B12, B31, P0)
The name of Adam Smith is more often than not associated with The Wealth
of nations (Wn). But his first book was The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS).
The place of TMS in the literature on Smith is problem- atic. When it was first
published, TMS was a success. Then, for a long time, TMS tended to be
disregarded as an uninteresting book. But ignoring TMS to concentrate on Wn did
not erase TMS from the list of Smith’s work. indeed, in recent years, TMS has been
(re)discovered and its richness is now being (re)appreciated.
laurence Dickey (1986) is one of many who analyze how the relation between
Smith’s two books is treated in the literature (see also Montes 2004 and PetersFransen 2000). Dickey claims that the “The Adam Smith Problem”, the problem of
the consistency or lack of thereof between Wn and TMS, can take at least four
forms. in one approach, TMS and Wn are two separate and non reconcilable entities
– this is the Adam Smith Problem traditionally understood (Oncken 1897). in a
second approach, TMS swallows Wn, with Wn being like a long footnote to TMS –
this is the approach exemplified by A.l. Macfie and D.D. raphael (1984). in the
third approach, à la

Viner (1927), Wn and its system of natural liberty is the major focus of Smith’s
attention, and TMS just sits close by, in Wn’s shadow, as an additional source of
support. The fourth approach, the one of Dickey himself, considers “three rather
than one or two motivating centers” (587); one center is Wn, the other one is TMS
1759 (TMS 1st-5th edition), and the third one is TMS 1790 (TMS 6th edition), the
edition finalized after the completion of Wn and with major changes.
With this paper, i address Dickey’s challenge, showing that Wn, TMS
1759 and even TMS 1790 are consistent with each other. i do not compare the three
books as a whole, or the entirety of their themes, approaches, styles, focuses, etc.
rather, i slice one common issue out of TMS 1759, Wn, and TMS 1790 and
compare its treatment in the three books. My conclusion is that TMS 1759 and TMS
1790 are one and the same book, and they are a book which is not in contradiction
with Wn. in their differences, they are intertwined, complemented and strengthened
by each other.
The single common thread i follow is the approbation gained from having
material possessions, an issue covered both in TMS (1759 and 1790) and in Wn. By
focusing exclusively on the approbation generated by showing off material
possession, i propose that Wn and TMS can be read as a symbiotic relation in
which neither book has dominance over the other, and that TMS
1790 is just an updated edition of TMS 1759, not a different book. i propose that all
four approaches to the problem summarized by Dickey have some validity, but none
of them is complete by itself. Similarly to Macfie and raphael’s approach of seeing
Wn as the applied version of TMS, i see TMS (1759 and 1790) as the “theory”
book and Wn as the “practice” book. But differently from them, i do not see Wn as
a simple application of TMS and its consequent lack of autonomy – i think that one
feeds off the other. To bet- ter understand “practice” we need a “theory”, and to have
a good “theory”, we need a “practice”. As proposed by the original formulation of
the Adam Smith Problem, one book stands independent from the other but, at the
same time, in contrast to that reading, combining the two (or three) makes a better
and stronger case, rather than generating an incoherent picture.
if we look at the approbation generated by material possession in the three-center
Adam Smith Problem of TMS 1759, TMS 1790 and Wn that Dickey presents as
well as to original Adam Smith Problem, we may get to opposite conclusions. in
TMS 1759, approbation from material possessions seems to generate a moral and
prosperous individual and society – in TMS
1790, less so. But in Wn, that same desire for approbation is described as a
potentially destabilizing force for individuals and society, not always bringing
prosperity or morality. TMS 1759, and even TMS 1790, seem to present a more
favorable account of this form of self-interest than Wn, which may sound counterintuitive given some of the previous expositions of the Adam Smith Problem.

On the other hand, if TMS (1759 and 1790) and Wn are somehow read together,
in terms of theory and practice, the contradiction is only apparent, and we can see
the same approbation, and the same consequences of it, in all three books. TMS
describes the general mechanism through which man gains approbation – a
combination of moral and material approbation – and in Wn, the same principle
works in a world where the amount of wealth and the involvement of government in
the economy change. The constraints that the individual faces in Wn change, and
they are meant to change given the historical narrations of Wn. But a change in
constraints changes the observed behaviors. The individual actions and their
consequences are therefore going to be different depending on what constraint the
individual faces. in Wn, indeed, the more prosperous a society is and the more a
government grants monopoly powers, the more incentives there are to rely on wealth
to receive approbation and the higher is the risk that individual would dismiss moral
conduct to achieve that wealth. Actually, it is only in Wn, when Smith describes
societies with increasing commerce, wealth, and government- granted monopolies,
that the consequences of the natural desire of approbation generate the potential ruin
of some individuals, as well as the socially disastrous mercantilist policies, rather
than the betterment of the individual and of his society (Paganelli 2009).
The treatment of approbation in one book can stand independently from the
exposition of it in the other book. But at the same time, combining them makes a
much better and stronger case. if we look at the revisions that Smith makes, rather
than seeing the Adam Smith Problem with three centers à la Dickey, with the 6th
edition of TMS being the major source of the Problem, we can see the feedback
mechanism often present when theories are put into practice and practices are
analyzed through theories. The theory is updated, given some practical results.
Updating is not changing. The general idea still holds. But now we are able to
account for the “difficult” cases as well as for the general case. Seen in these terms,
what may look like contradicting results is in fact conciliated as the two faces of the
same coin.
The paper develops as follows. The next section describes the theoretical
mechanism through which one can gain approbation as presented in TMS. The
following section illustrates the practical consequences of acting in a world with
“politics, revenue, and arms” as described in Wn. Concluding remarks end the
paper.
Approbation in TMS
in TMS 1759, Smith explains how approbation works. Approbation comes
from two different channels: an appropriate moral conduct and the social status
associated with the possession of wealth.
The approbation generated from appropriate moral conduct generally

gives us incentives to behave morally as well as, unintentionally, to generate moral
rules of conduct that are the embodiment of behaviors that give moral approbation
(Muller 1995). rules of appropriate moral conduct come from the habit of
“adjusting the pitch of our passions” to the level we think others would show if they
were in our place (TMS iii.i-iii). We want to “adjust the pitch of our passions” to
what we think the expectations of others are, because one approves the presence in
others of the same feeling that one has (TMS i.i.2.1 and i.ii)1.
Additionally, the desire to be approved of is also fulfilled by the visible
accumulation of wealth. And indeed, the reason why men accumulate wealth is to
receive the approbation of others (TMS i.iii.2.1). Wealth is a visible and easily
distinguishable sign of distinction. The more wealth one has, the more attention he
attracts, and the more approbation he gains. Furthermore, the approbation deriving
from possessing fortunes is strengthened by the process through which the fortune is
accumulated. He who wants to pursue “wealth and greatness” will gain not only the
approbation granted to possessors of wealth, but also the admiration and the esteem
of the observers when he acts in a morally appropriate way (TMS iV. 2.8).
Our desire to be approved therefore can have positive consequences for the
individual – individuals can both learn how to be virtuous and moral and can gain
material fortune. Under these circumstances, the positive consequences of the desire
to gain approbation at the individual level extend to the social level as well. The
desire to gain approbation drives man not only to generate rules of moral conduct
but also to transform natural challenges into useful things (TMS, iV.1: 9-10).
TMS 1759 therefore describes how approbation generates positive out- comes
both for the individual and for society. Dickey claims that TMS 1790 is a different
book from TMS 1759 because Smith changes his mind, among other things,
regarding what approbation from material possession can do. Holding constant the
effects of approbation due to moral behaviors, Smith introduces some potential
negative effects of our desire for approbation achieved through accumulation and
parade of riches in i.iii.3 and in part Vi, all added in the last edition. But even with
these considerations, if one reads TMS by itself, approbation does not seem to
generate major negative material consequences for individual or society, especially
when compared to what Wn portrays.
Smith describes the potential negative consequences of the desire for approbation
from wealth accumulation in TMS 1790, in a chapter titled “Of

1 For a recent attempt to formally model it, see Khalil 2005. For Smith the
development of fellow-feelings is an imperfect process, the accuracy of which
decreases as social distance increases.

the corruption of our moral sentiments, which is occasioned by this disposition to
admire the rich and the great and to despise or neglect the persons of poor and mean
condition” (i.iii. 3). Here Smith notices that the greater admiration for men of fortune
may induce individuals to take great moral risks (TMS i.iii. 3.8). if the results of the
morally questionable actions are positive, they gain the approbation from the higher
level of wealth, and their immoral misbehavior will be ignored. Similarly, in Part Vi
of TMS we find that reproachable behaviors generate great admiration when the
resulting gains are great, while they generate contempt if the gains are “petty”
(TMS Vi.i.
16: 217). What Smith is telling us, then, is that we are willing to gamble moral
approbation for wealth approbation. We are willing to give up moral approbation if
we think that we can gain a lot of material approbation. The higher is the gain in
material approbation, the more we will be willing to risk in terms of moral
approbation.
This is not surprising given that material possessions are easier to recognize, and
therefore approve, than moral (mis)behaviors (TMS i.iii. 3.4). Thus, given the high
recognizability of wealth and the difficulties with which virtue is distinguished from
morally questionable behaviors, we tend to rely more on wealth than on morality
when we give approbation to others (TMS Vi.ii.1.
20). Similarly, we rely more on wealth than on morality when we seek approbation
from others. The frequency of moral gambles is even less surprising when one
considers that in Wn Smith claims that people systematically over- estimate their
probability of success and underestimate their probability of failure. gambling
morality does not seem too different from gambling for- tunes through a lottery or
(lack of) insurance (Wn, i.x.b)2.
A couple of considerations are relevant here. First, despite the possible
disillusion at the end of one’s life, the anxiety, and the infamy of a dirty con- science
of an individual (TMS i.iii.3.8), the consequences of trading off moral approbation
for material gains at the social level do not appear to be devastating3. Second, the
ease with which one is willing to give up moral approbation for material approbation
depends on the amount of material gains one makes. The larger the material gain,
the more likely one is willing to behave in morally disappovable ways.
if one stops here, two contradictions emerge, like the ones Dickey points to. First,
Smith changed his mind from TMS 1759 to TMS 1790, because now approbation
from moral possession has high costs, not just high bene-

2 For an analysis of the consequences of overestimation of the probability of success
in the loanable funds market in Smith see Paganelli 2003.
3 Even factions, where local moral approbation is favored over the general good, do
not seem to be a seri- ous or permanent threat (TMSTMS Vi.ii.2.13-14, Vi.iii.12.1920).

fits. Second, despite these differences within the various editions of TMS, in TMS
the consequences of gaining approbation through the accumulation of wealth remain,
generally, positive. The disruptive consequences of gambling morality for material
wealth remain on a private and moral level. The end result is still, generally, a
betterment of an individual’s material condition as well as of his society. This,
however, is not always the case in Wn, where pursuing approbation through
material possessions has more ambiguous con- sequences, being dependent on how
rich society is. in Wn Smith is frazzled about how disruptive the consequence of
pursuing material approbation can be, if a society is rich. But he is not, if the society
is not rich.
What i propose here is that these differences are not due to a different perspective
or a different motivation at the base of human behavior. They are simply due to the
development of an awareness of differences in the constraints that individuals face.
Wn introduces differences in the environment in which an individual operates. The
mechanisms are the same, but the out- comes are different if we are in a poor society
or in a rich society, as the incentives in these different environments vary. TMS 1790
accounts for the possibilities of differences in the constraints within the same model,
differences which were overlooked in TMS 1759.
let us see how Smith explains how approbation works in the real world, in a
world with “police, revenue, and arms”, as described in Wn.
Approbation in WN
Wn is well known, correctly, for the idea that pursuing one’s interest to better
oneself would generate not only individual prosperity, but also social prosperity.
There is no need to restate this argument here. Yet, contrary to what is often
presumed, Wn does not always match the depicted picture or the optimism present
in TMS. in Wn, the people “whom heaven in its anger has visited with ambition” are
not always gaining social status and benefiting society. Smith, in Wn, talks about
unambiguously ruinous consequences both for individuals and for society when the
desire for approbation meets the enormous commercial fortunes. Wn indeed
describes how consequences of our desire for approbation may potentially become
increasingly negative as society becomes richer. When a society is poor, there is not
much to show off and not much to gain with questionable behaviors. But the wealth
of a rich society generates perverse incentives that may lead to the ruin of the
individual or of society itself. if read in isolation, the analysis for approbation in Wn
is sound, yet dark (Paganelli 2008).
Wn has a first explanation of how we are willing to gamble away moral- ly
approvable behaviors to gain material fortune in its account of wage determination in
book 1 chapter 10. David levy (1999) highlights how large changes in money are
able to change one person’s rank and the social approbation

that comes with it. People are therefore willing to take large risks, such as attempting to
succeed in some very competitive professions, to try to improve their material status.
The trading off of moral approbation for material application under different
constraints is explicit in Wn ii.iii.38-42. Here Smith describes how every man
suffers from a “base and selfish disposition.” When the wealth and the riches of
commerce and manufactures are introduced, they bring along durable goods, such as
“frivolous trinkets.” Spending on durable goods is more directed toward oneself than
toward others. The “selfish disposition” in us is unleashed with morally questionably
behaviors. indeed “where he can spend the greatest revenue upon his own person, he
frequently has no bound to his expense, because he frequently has no bounds to his
vanity, or to his affection for his own person” (Wn iii.iv.16). This “base and selfish
disposition” is present even in poor non-commercial societies. But because there is
very little on which to gratify one’s “most childish vanity,” the temptations of human
“folly” are less and weaker. indeed when a man can spend his fortune only on
consumption goods, such as sumptuous meals and numerous servants, his “selfish
disposition” is well constrained. When spending one’s for- tune implies spending on
others as well as on oneself, as consumption goods usually imply, only very few
people will go bankrupt. This is the case in “nations to whom commerce and
manufactures are little known” (Wn iii.iv.5). indeed, Smith repeats, in noncommercial societies “seldom [one has temptations] so violent as to attempt to
maintain more than he can afford” (Wn iii.iv.16).
The increase of wealth, changing the constraints, increases the incentives for
reckless behavior. The glitter of wealth blinds prudence. The negative consequences
will also be more severe. With the introduction of commercial wealth, indeed,
individual ruin becomes more common, as individual behavior becomes less
prudent. Proprietors are willing to sell their birthrights in exchange “for a pair of
diamond buckles … for the gratification of the most childish, the meanest and the
most sordid of all vanities, they gradually bartered their whole power and authority”
(Wn iii.iv. 10-15). They think that they would gain approbation by showing off their
unique trinkets, even if they lose moral approbation because of their sordid, childish
and vain behaviors. They think they are “bettering their condition” by buying
“trinkets and baubles.” in reality, by so doing, they are bound to become poor. True,
this drive for approbation is the cause of the dismantling of feudal institutions—
which is a good thing for society (rosenberg 1968, rosenberg 1990). But the “folly”
and the gratification of “the most childish vanity” tear away the stability of land
property and generations of family riches, and bring individuals and their families to
ruin (Wn iii.iv.16-17: 422).
When the same change in constraints is faced by the sovereign, differences in
behavior are parallel. The consequences, though, are felt not just at

the individual level but at the societal level as well. Smith explains: “The
ignorance of the times [among nations to whom commerce and manufactures are
little known] affords but few of the trinkets in which that finery consists […]. in a
commercial country abounding with every sort of expensive luxury, the sovereign, in
the same manner as almost all the great proprietors in his dominions, naturally spends
a great part of his revenue in purchasing those luxuries. His own and the
neighbouring countries supply him abundantly with all the costly trinkets which
compose the splendid, but insignificant pageantry of a court” (Wn V.iii. 2-3). And
since the sovereign will spend his revenue on futile things when there is peace, when
war comes, he will go into debt. Unfortunately, “[t]he progress of the enormous debts
which at present oppress, and will in the long run probably ruin, all the great nations
of Europe, has been pretty uniform” (Wn V.iii. 10). Even if Smith is not very
preoccupied by it, the ruin of a country is a possible threat of commercial society
caused by the possibilities that commerce itself offers.
The change in constraints that commercial society brings about is also felt at the
policy level. Merchants and manufacturers, in their desire to improve their image in
the eyes of others, now have opportunities to do so in a grand manner. The wealth
generated by commerce is unprecedented and can be concentrated in their hands, if
only the government grants them monopolies. Merchants and manufacturers are
willing to take the moral tradeoff – to increase their fortune and status at the expense
of the rest of society; they are willing to elbow their way over their competitors,
even if these are reproach- able behaviors, because with monopoly power, they will
gain much wealth and approbation. The increase in personal wealth brings an
increase in social approbation sufficient to outweigh any possible disapprobation for
the meth- ods used to achieve it. in Wn, given the perverse incentives that large
commercial wealth can create, the social consequences of our desire for approbation
can be devastating (Evensky 2005). Mercantilist policies deform, distort, and
impoverish society (Wn iV.viii.c. 43; i.xi. p.10, iV.i. 10, iV.ii. 38, iV.iii.c: 910). Merchants and manufacturers are able to extort ferocious laws from the
legislature (Wn iV.viii. 17; iV.ii. 43; iV.viii. 53).
The wealth of commercial societies changes the constraints that individuals face.
When the possibilities to gain approbation from wealth are large enough, they
may incentivize more morally questionable actions and generate potentially
disastrous consequences. it is after this realization that TMS
1790 is changed. Behaviors and their consequences differ under different levels of
wealth. This change in constraints has to be accounted for in the theoretical
description of approbation. The model remains the same. it is just updated, given a
case not previously considered, to account for all the circumstances.

Conclusions
Focusing on a single common issue among TMS 1759, TMS 1790 and Wn may
help us better understand the relationship between the books and the different
editions of TMS. looking at approbation deriving from material possession suggests
that TMS (1759 and 1790) and Wn are two distinct books, each standing alone on its
own feet, yet feeding off the other. TMS can be interpreted as the “theory” book – the
book containing the positive description of the mechanism through which
approbation works – and Wn as the “practice” book—the book that looks at how
man lives in a world with “police, revenue, and arms”, where the level of wealth
changes through time, and where the government is a concrete player of tangible
force.
The same desire to gain the approbation of others motivates the man of
TMS 1759, the man of Wn, and the man of TMS 1790. But while in TMS
1759 the desire of approbation does make, generally, the individual and society better
off, in Wn this result is questioned, and the desire to gain approbation is described
as potentially generating individual and social disruption. This is not because the two
books are inconsistent with each other, but rather because one book has individuals
facing the different and changing constraints of a world of “police, revenue, and
arms” and the other one, describing a theoretical model, does not. The additions in
TMS 1790 can be interpreted as a simple update of the previous description of
approbation, rather than a change of mind. The man of Wn is the same as the man of
the various editions of TMS. The mechanisms through which he gains approbation
are the same in TMS 1759 and in Wn, TMS 1790 presenting a more complete
account of it than TMS 1759. The differences appear as a synergic point when the
two books in their various editions are read together. reading TMS and Wn together
allows one to interpret Smith as explaining that approbation derives both from
appropriate moral conduct and from wealth, but that enough wealth can trump moral
conduct in achieving approbations and can generate social malfunctions. The
strength of the incentives in poor pre-commercial societies is different from the
strength of the incentives in rich commercial societies and as a consequence
behaviors and consequences will differ. The apparent contrast between the two
editions of TMS can therefore be interpreted as only apparent.
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